Clinical epidemiology: A daydream? by Jan P. Vandenbroucke
ESSAY
Clinical epidemiology: A daydream?
Jan P. Vandenbroucke1,2,3
Received: 22 November 2016 / Accepted: 10 January 2017 / Published online: 24 January 2017
 The Author(s) 2017. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
The leitmotif of my inaugural address at Leiden University
in 1986 [1] was a quote by the first professor of epidemi-
ology at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical
Medicine, Major Greenwood. In 1936 Greenwood descri-
bed how 100 years earlier, in the first half of the nineteenth
century, there had been a movement in France, the so-
called ‘Me´decine d’Observation’, i.e., ‘Observational
Medicine’. The figurehead of that movement, Pierre
Charles Alexandre Louis, argued that one needed to study
large groups of patients and draw numerical conclusions as
a basis for the theory and the practice of medicine. Louis’s
fame lives on because of a report where he tried to show
that bloodletting was of no avail in patients with pneu-
monia [2]. Greenwood, however, described how the
movement had never made it—it had disappeared from the
clinic, and he concluded with a lament: ‘‘If only Louis had
succeeded in really commanding the support of… the great
clinical teachers of Paris, if Trousseau had had a service
statistique and Dieulafoy!… I dare say that by now [in
1936] the Royal Colleges would be considering the desir-
ability of establishing a Diploma in Clinical Statistics and
clinical units would have statisticians. But this is mere day-
dreaming.’’ [3].
That was my daydream, too—it was my motivation to
accept the Chair of Clinical Epidemiology at Leiden
University in the Netherlands in 1986.
Over the past 30 years, numerical research on groups of
patients has taken off spectacularly [4]. By ‘numerical
research’ I mean research in which persons (e.g., patients)
are the unit of observation and characteristics, or outcomes,
are counted in groups of persons. The upsurge of numerical
research happened really quickly. ‘Evidence-based Medi-
cine’, the movement that is in favour of basing medical
practice on numerical data, and the ‘Cochrane Collabora-
tion’, which advocates that these numerical data should be
combined in systematic literature reviews, have become
household words for everyone with a medical education.
Yet, the notions ‘Evidence-based Medicine’ and ‘Cochrane
Collaboration’ as we know them today did not exist at the
time of my inaugural address. Only in 1992 these names
were introduced in medical journals and it was described
what they stood for [5, 6].
In the first part of this paper, I will describe the way in
which micro-history, i.e., my own career and the depart-
ment clinical epidemiology at Leiden, The Netherlands, are
interwoven with this macro-history. This aims at giving a
glimpse of how clinical epidemiology was introduced and
became influential in one European country. It is of
necessity steeped in local and personal history.
The next two parts will treat problems that preoccupied
me over the years. Firstly, the problem of the
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oversimplification of the clinical application of epidemi-
ology, the problem of ‘cookbook epidemiology’. Secondly,
my concern about a possible dismantling of science; the
battle for the soul of science.
In a brief third part, I will look at what work is still left
to do to make Greenwood’s daydream come completely
true.
Micro-history and Macro-history
My first encounter with epidemiology was in an optional
course during my medical training in Leuven, Belgium, in
1971. I was immediately and completely captivated. I liked
the ‘helicopter view’, the idea that you can reflect on dis-
eases in entire populations in size and number; that you are
able to understand how and why the number of cases of a
disease is high or low in a population, and how this may
change in the course of time. This was a line of thinking
that was entirely different from all the other courses in the
medical curriculum.
After my medical training, I specialized in internal
medicine. Halfway through the specialisation, I became
restless and longed for more insights. By chance, I saw an
announcement for The Ten Day International Teaching
Seminar in Cardiovascular Epidemiology, in Denmark in
1976—organized by Rose and Jeremiah Stamler, with
Geoffrey Rose, Dick Remington and Henry Blackburn on
the faculty. When the course was over, I had made my
decision: becoming an epidemiologist was the greatest
thing in the world.
I took more epidemiology courses, including a new one
that was organised by the Dutch Heart Foundation in 1977,
taught by a leading academic from the Harvard School of
Public Health, Olli Miettinen. He presented new view-
points on old epidemiological notions and suggested I
come to Boston for further training. At Harvard, in
1978–1979, I got to know the content of epidemiology.
This was one great intellectual feast. But, I also came
across ideas about epidemiology. There was talk about a
new movement, which was only a few years old, to bring
epidemiology back to the clinic. The story that went with it
was that a rift had developed between ‘Schools of Public
Health’ and ‘Schools of Medicine’. Schools of Public
Health had been founded in the nineteenth century and the
beginning of the 20 st century. All the numerical thinking
about health and disease and about causes and evolution of
frequencies of disease had ended up in the Schools of
Public Health. It had disappeared from Schools of Medi-
cine. Only basic scientific research and pathophysiological
research were practised in Medical Schools and offered as
the scientific basis of medicine. This had to change—it was
said—because medicine had become increasingly
powerful, expensive and complex. There was a need for
more knowledge in size and number about patients, their
histories and the clinical course of their diseases, as a
guideline for medical reasoning about aetiology, diagnosis,
prognosis and interventions. Thus, it was held necessary to
found departments of clinical epidemiology. The Rocke-
feller Foundation and the Robert Wood Johnson Founda-
tion supported these ideas. The atmosphere was rife with
slogans such as ‘Clinical Epidemiology, a basic science for
clinical medicine’ and ‘Clinical Epidemiology, the archi-
tecture of clinical medical research’—which became titles
of highly influential textbooks [7, 8].
These ideas immediately tied in with my thinking and
my preoccupations: this was what I wanted to devote
myself to.
After my training in Boston, I enthusiastically approa-
ched medical schools in my home country, Belgium, and
proposed to found a combined centre for statistics, epi-
demiology and informatics (still in its infancy in medical
applications at the time)—with the express purpose of
assisting clinicians in conducting clinical research. There
was no interest. Miettinen suggested to enquire in the
Netherlands, with the Netherlands Heart Foundation. In the
Netherlands, medical charity funds were among the first
institutions to actively start supporting epidemiology in its
clinical applications. The then medical director of the
Netherlands Heart Foundation, had established contacts at
the Harvard School of Public Health, which was the reason
why Miettinen had started to give annual courses in the
Netherlands, –of which I had followed the first. Due to his
courses and influence, various epidemiologists and health
professionals from the Netherlands were trained at the
Harvard School of Public Health already in the 1970s, and
even more in the 1980s and 1990s.
The Netherlands Heart Foundation offered me a job to
help grant applicants to write up better research proposals.
One was Hans Valkenburg, head of epidemiology at the
Erasmus University Rotterdam—originally an internist and
microbiologist, trained in population epidemiologic
research in the United States. Valkenburg had been brought
to Rotterdam by the founding dean of the Rotterdam
medical school, Andries Querido. Querido became inter-
ested in ‘community medicine’ in the 1960s: the idea was
that one had to understand diseases in the community in
which they originate. Upon the foundation of the new
Rotterdam medical school, he made sure that an indepen-
dent department of epidemiology was included [9].
Valkenburg provided me with a great deal of critical
feedback about the teaching I had received at Harvard—
and I thought him all the more sympathetic for it. After just
over a year, in 1981, I switched to his department.
Ideas from the other side of the ocean had an increas-
ingly strong impact in the Netherlands. At the Amsterdam
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Medical Center, there was a strong influence from the
Clinical Epidemiology department at McMaster, Canada,
amongst others via Harry Buller who had trained there
when he was still a resident. We charged around the
Netherlands with a group of enthusiasts, comprising also
Bert Hofman and Koos Lubsen from Rotterdam. We
organised evenings at university hospitals, with exercises
on reading clinical research—without any funding and
without any association with any training scheme—just in
everybody’s spare time—because it was so much fun and
so new. In 1984, a brainstorming session was organised
about the future of clinical epidemiology in the Nether-
lands, attended by a representative of the Rockefeller
Foundation [10].
Suddenly, there was interest everywhere. The scarce
epidemiologists were offered chairs in several universities
in the Netherlands. Under the supervision of Hans
Valkenburg from Rotterdam, with help of the head
rheumatology at Leiden University, I had gained a doc-
torate in 1983 with research about a possible protection
from rheumatoid arthritis by the use of oral contraceptives
[11, 12]. This paved the way. Leiden University Medical
School decided to dismantle the department of social
medicine, which was thought to be ‘old’ and replace it with
the ‘new’ clinical epidemiology. Three years after my
doctorate, in September 1986, at the age of 36, I found
myself in the brand new building of the current Leiden
University Medical Center, as the head of an empty
department—all on my own in three rooms, next to the
hospital beds storage, sitting on cardboard boxes. This
unusual place was the result of the fact that I had insisted
on being located within the university hospital, and not
somewhere in a far-away ‘research’ building. It had to be
easy for clinicians to walk in.
Immediately I established contacts with clinical
departments in order to find topics that enabled me to
demonstrate what the clinical application of epidemiology
was good for. Three months after my arrival in Leiden, I
met a clinician doing research on venous thrombosis. He
told me they had reached a dead end in the research into
rare biochemical abnormalities that might be the cause of
deep vein thrombosis. Patients who developed thrombosis
at an early age, especially when this happened several
times in one family, were sent to Leiden from all over the
Netherlands for elucidation of possible biochemical
abnormalities. Yet, internationally, it was strongly doubted
whether all of the, mostly rare, hereditary abnormalities
which were found were a good explanation of the causes of
the thrombosis in these patients. My immediate response,
based on my methodological training, was to tell my Lei-
den colleagues to stop collecting ‘rare postage stamps’.
Rather than conducting research with patients referred
from far and wide, I proposed to set up a case–control study
with successive patients as they presented in daily practice,
with an accompanying control group from the popula-
tion—and to determine the presence of their favourite
coagulation abnormalities in both groups. In itself, this
design was a major innovation within coagulation research.
The research was set up in intensive cooperation with
clinicians and basic scientists. The rest is history: the dis-
covery of factor V Leiden [13], the interaction of factor V
Leiden with ‘the pill’ [14], the ‘oral contraceptive contro-
versy’ with an increased risk of vein thrombosis due to
newer contraceptives [15], the research into the effect of
coagulation mutations in the past, until well in the nine-
teenth century [16, 17].
In addition to coagulation, the Leiden department of
clinical epidemiology occupied itself with a great many
other subjects: psychiatry, nephrology, general internal
medicine, endocrinology, skin diseases, geriatric medicine
and rheumatology. There were breakthroughs in several
areas—always in collaboration with physician-researchers,
often together with basic scientist. By way of example, we
did research into the presence of antibodies in patients with
rheumatoid arthritis, who had been blood donors long
before becoming patients, and in whom the antibodies were
detected in their stored blood—long before they developed
the disease [18]. Diversity is often the fate of the epi-
demiologist. My hero Greenwood once wrote that he
himself had not discovered that much new, but had helped
others to discover new things [19]. I also often look back
with a great deal of joy on things that I influenced indi-
rectly, such as the research into the inverse relationship
between longevity and fertility—based on historical data
from the British nobility [20].
One aspect became gradually clear: the clinical appli-
cation of epidemiology as it developed in Leiden differed
from that of other types of clinical epidemiology. When
Evidence-Based Medicine and the Cochrane Collaboration
movements originated at the beginning of the 1990s, the
application was mainly in research into diagnosis, prog-
nosis and therapy; not in aetiology, the causes of disease—
nor in pathogenesis, how these causes interact with the
organism. The focus of Leiden epidemiology was precisely
these—in particular about disease processes that were of
interest to third line physicians working at university hos-
pitals. Following a working visit, Alvan Feinstein told me
that we practised ‘pathophysiological epidemiology’. In
1989, I described some guiding principles of the Leiden
department [21].
We founded a ‘school’, and that was precisely the
intention. With my close colleague and later successor as
the head of the department, Frits Rosendaal, we established
a clinical epidemiology course on a remote spot in the
Netherlands (a small island a few kilometres offshore).
With the department of internal medicine we set up an
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epidemiology internship for residents in internal medicine.
It was one of the most coveted internships. Many of the
residents who followed this internship ended up as training
supervisors for residents, department heads and chairper-
sons of national committees. This is not an experimental
observation, of course: the residents who chose this
internship probably already had wider interests, but it is a
joyous observation all the same.
In this first part, I have tried to make clear how my
career was propelled, mixed with and sometimes chal-
lenged in an international ‘clinical epidemiology’ move-
ment. This description does not answer the question why
numerical thinking broke through in the clinic, and why
this did not happen before, in particular at the beginning of
the nineteenth century around the time of Me´decine
d’Observation [4, 22, 23]. This needs further reflection
from medical historians [24].
In these developments, I came across a number of
problems about which I entered into extensive debates: the
battle against cookbook epidemiology and the battle for the
soul of science.
Cookbook epidemiology
Evidence-based Medicine originated from clinical epi-
demiology in the 1980s and early 1990s. It was to be a radical
break with the past: no longer was medicine to be based on
mere expert opinion and on half-baked ideas from basic
sciences, but it should be based on an ‘objective’ numerical
foundation by directly countingwhat happens to people. The
most objective research, it was thought, was the randomised
controlled double blind trial. This led to the idea of a hier-
archy of evidence, with the randomised trial right at the top,
and all non-experimental forms of research, such as obser-
vational research in its various forms further down—as these
were considered to be increasingly suspect.
This hierarchy was a thorn in my side from the word go.
Medical practice is not based only on results of experi-
ments on diagnostics or therapy. There are a great many
important insights that you cannot test with a randomised
experiment: think of the transmission of infectious dis-
eases, e.g., think of HIV; needless to say, no experiments
have been carried out on its transmission in people—and
yet we believe observations from which we deduce how
this virus is transmitted—global campaigns are based on
this knowledge. Think also about genetic knowledge that
increasingly leads clinical decisions and is inherently
observational.
My argument was and is that you need all forms of
research—which type of research depends on the research
question. Depending on the research question, all types of
research are of equal value [25, 26].
However, this debate about the hierarchy of evidence is
now the debate of the twentieth century. It has been
replaced with a new debate in the twenty-first century,
about a new form of simplification that goes much further.
This new movement calls itself ‘causal inference’ [27].
One basic idea of this movement is that you can only make
causal statements about interventions. Causing something
presupposes that you do something, perform an interven-
tion. This is always the case in a randomised trial; after the
randomisation, you set up an intervention in one group, and
a different one in the other group. The new movement
argues that observational research may be just as worth-
while as randomised trials—which seems an improvement
compared to Evidence-Based Medicine. Yet, it argues that
observational research can only demonstrate and estimate
causality when interventions are involved. What is wrong
with this? One consequence is that what is not an inter-
vention, but a ‘state’, can no longer be researched as a
cause [28, 29]. For example, you can no longer compare
the survival rate of a group of fatter people to that of a
group of thinner people, and decide that being fat causes a
shortened life expectancy, because being fat or thin are not
interventions. The same would then apply to the state of
high blood pressure, or high cholesterol, or having dia-
betes: you cannot say anything causal about these ‘states’.
They are not interventions and fall outside this so-called
‘interventionist view’ of causes. However, there are more
views regarding causality: next to ‘interventionist causal-
ity’ there are ‘etiological or historical causes’ as well [30].
These are causes that provide an insight into how some-
thing comes about, and this may involve ‘states’—on
which we might currently not be able to intervene—but
where we might be able to intervene at some point in the
causal chain in the future, and which are important to
understand how diseases come about. The understanding of
what a cause is, is far too limited in this new thinking. It is
not very smart to rely on one type of causality for epi-
demiology. We need various forms of causality.
Why am I fussing so much about these very abstract
reasonings on causality? Because in this new thinking, it
suddenly looks as though a great deal of research about
how diseases originate is no longer legitimate and is
somehow second rate. This disregards the actual power of
epidemiology.
The essential problem of ‘cookbook thinking’ is that
solutions are only sought within rules and procedures of
one type of knowledge: the methodology of numerical
research. When you have ticked off all the methodologic
rules, you may decide that something is a cause. This sit-
uation is very similar to that of the story of Baron von
Munchausen, who wanted to pull himself out of a swamp
by pulling on his own hair. This does not work: in order to
get out of a swamp, you need a lever, a lever from outside.
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That is exactly the same in science. In all sciences. The
basic scientist who looks for an explanation for the car-
cinogenic effect of tobacco smoke, does so because of
background knowledge from another science: epidemiol-
ogy. If she did not have epidemiological knowledge about
smoking and lung cancer, it would be foolish to search for
a carcinogenic mechanism related to tobacco smoke [31].
Thanks to epidemiology, she can even afford to throw all
negative findings away, until she discovers something that
seems carcinogenic, for there must be a mechanism. Epi-
demiology as a science deals with occurrence research in
groups of people. Epidemiology also needs levers: data can
only be collected and interpreted in the light of a story
about how things come about. Deciding that something is a
cause requires a judgement in which one brings together
results from various types of research, and various types of
science. This becomes a weighting of methodologic argu-
ments, of the exclusion of alternative explanations, of
background knowledge from basic-science and patho-
physiological mechanisms. There are no rules for this
weighting. A judgement that something is a cause always
remains a risk; it is a type of ‘best guess’, based on cur-
rently available information. This feels uncomfortable.
People try to escape this situation with box-checking
strategies. But it remains inescapable: judgement originates
through integration and weighting of relevant research and
theory.
Some of the original objections that I and others have
made to this type of ‘causal inference’ [32], and answers by
the originators of this movement [33, 34] have led to an
array of papers, published in the December 2016 issue of
the International Journal of Epidemiology. Interested
readers can read all arguments and counterarguments in
full in several papers in that issue.
The battle for the soul of science
Science is fragile. Science is fragile because it is based on
an agreement between people about how to organise the
acquisition of knowledge.
The nineteenth century American philosopher Charles
Peirce described how there are various sources of knowl-
edge: tradition, authority, dogma and science. He argued
that science is the best source because it means that you
jointly search for the right answer, in mutual debate, based
on investigations (i.e., research). We agree these days that
science only exists when research is published publicly and
discussed publicly. No research is perfect, and it is possible
to criticise any research, but this does not matter—this is
the very thing you have to argue about. It is precisely
because of the imperfection of the previous research that
you set up new research. Consensus originates from the
discussion; it is never final, is subject to continuous change
and is never complete. This view of science allows to put
our day-to-day activities into perspective. Some scientific
investigations may be on the wrong track for a long time.
Yet we argue that science is ‘self-cleansing’ in the long
run—admittedly, sometimes in the very long run. ‘Self-
cleansing’ is not to say that we will eventually know how
reality works, but it means that ideas that are in conflict
with reality will perish in the shorter or longer run. But,
that can only happen if the principle of a public debate
based on public investigations is followed.
A great deal can go wrong. Many problems arise under
the influence of external factors, where profit plays an
important role. This is most clearly visible in research set
up by the pharmaceutical industry. Research by one man-
ufacturer nearly always ends up in favour of their own
product and to the detriment of the competitor [35, 36].
Please note that all research—and this includes basic sci-
entific research—has a tendency to move towards results
that are believed by the researcher. The reason is that
research is ‘theory-loaded’: in setting up a study, the
concerns and judgements of the researcher play an
important role. That leads to a great many minor and major
decisions about the type of patients, the type of outcomes,
the way in which you set up the comparison, the duration
of the research, etc.; all these decisions influence the out-
come and interpretation of research [35, 36].
The solution is not just public debate in itself. Public
debate is best served by new research that is set up dif-
ferently by critics of the old research. Unfortunately, that is
no longer possible for research into products of the phar-
maceutical industry, because there is no funding for such
separate research—the industry itself exclusively decides
what research is carried out with its products, and how it is
carried out. It is not unthinkable that successive new
products push out older ones, and are slightly less good in
some respects—but that we will never find out. To find out,
we need research that is set up differently by different
persons. Please note that this is not to say that the research
of the critic always survives and that the research of the
industry is always wrong. But in order to know which
research survives, both research undertakings—funded by
industry and not funded by industry—have to be present.
As research into new medicines is set up and carried out
almost exclusively by the pharmaceutical industry, a full
and worthy debate about the merits of new drugs is no
longer possible. Then science ceases to exist [37–39].
The problems are not just about money. Another threat
is excessive ‘autonomy’ thinking. Opposition to it brought
me in debates with health lawyers, ethicists and persons
concerned with privacy. My starting point was that for
centuries, physicians have been learning from what they
experience with patients; they learn lessons from what
Clinical epidemiology: A daydream? 99
123
occurs to their patients in practice. This is one of the
sources of progress in medicine. To me, it logically follows
that this is a sufficient reason, and a compelling argument,
to use the stored data and material of patients who have
already been treated in the past in order to learn from the
experience with these previous patients for patients in the
future. This idea is increasingly at odds with the norm of
absolute autonomy where patients need to be asked if this
is permitted [40, 41]. I argued against this tendency on the
basis of the principle of solidarity, and also because of the
idea that no personal damage whatsoever is caused to
patients by the use of past data; on the contrary, patients are
often enthusiastic that their data, their suffering, will be
used for new insights that may help others. It has repeat-
edly been demonstrated that research with existing data
where individual permission is asked, leads to false results
because it is precisely the people who are faced with an
unpleasant outcome who respond negatively when you ask
permissions (see multiple references in Ref. 36). In the past
decade, this battle has moved to the European level.
Open science, as described by Peirce is also under other
pressures: first, by the exceedingly competitive selection
mechanisms that are forced on young scientists during
grant application processes, because of a dearth of
financing—and second, because at the same time more and
more often the results of science are not accepted and
denied for political, ideological or economic reasons. The
central question remains how self-evident it is that the ideal
of an ‘open science’ will continue to exist. It is an agree-
ment amongst humans about the organisation of the
acquisition of knowledge. This agreement originated in a
certain era, many centuries ago. It is a cultural expression
that requires an effort to keep it up, in particular when the
results are not always easily accepted. Cultural expressions
may disappear. It takes vigilance to ensure that they con-
tinue to exist [42].
The future of Greenwood’s daydream
In his 1936 daydream, Greenwood stated that the clinical
application of statistics would be institutionalized as a
diploma, awarded by the Royal Colleges whose task it is to
register medical specialists in the UK. What is the current
situation of the combination of clinical medicine with
epidemiology?
The picture is mixed. Some years ago, the departmental
head of one department of epidemiology of a School of
Public Health in the US told me: ‘‘We are the last of a
dying species’’. By ‘dying species’ he meant: the physi-
cian-epidemiologist. In his department, there were no
longer physicians who follow the epidemiology masters
course, let alone the PhD. In his view, clinical departments
need to employ PhD epidemiologists for the supervision of
clinical research. In contrast at other departments of epi-
demiology and other schools of public health in the US,
separate course in epidemiology exist for clinicians, some
already with a long tradition. Also in European countries
the situations is mixed. In the Netherlands there is a large
influx of non-medical Master and PhD students in the
formal epidemiology training programmes. In Denmark, I
still see many medical students and young medical doctors
doing epidemiologic research before or during clinical
residency training programs.
My opinion remains that we need people with both types
of knowledge in one head. The same brain should under-
stand both worlds: the clinic and methodology. This leads
to creativity in setting up research and in the development
of new methodologies that are required to solve new
medical problems. People with both types of knowledge
are able to talk to pure clinicians as well as to pure
methodologists, and both conversations will run more
smoothly and have a better quality—which will lead to
better research. Clinicians with methodological knowledge
are almost the only ones still capable of in-depth reading of
clinical research. To the pure clinician, the clinical research
published in general medical journals is no longer really
understandable, because the design and the analyses have
become too complicated. To the pure methodologist, it may
not be evident how particular findings fit with background
clinical and basic science knowledge. People with both
types of knowledge are the ones that can make or break
clinical guidelines because they are able to adopt a critical
attitude towards the research behind the guidelines, and at
the same time they understand the way of thinking of
clinicians and the intricate organization of health care. If
we want to preserve and reinforce proper judgements about
the theory and practice of medicine—including the use of
‘big data’ and the use of ‘personalised medicine’—we need
people with both types of knowledge in one head.
Meanwhile, the large, enthusiastic tidal wave of clinical
epidemiology, on which I have surfed for the past 30 years,
together with many others, has stopped raging, and it is now
quietly lapping on the beach. The future will show what
solutions will be found for training, for career opportunities,
and for the positioning of clinicians with methodological
knowledge in the wider progress of medicine.
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